What it is exposed to now. Proven without the book.

"At time t, machine M bound to identity I held the committed position set S_t, and the exposure object E_t = f(S_t, prices_t) under the committed exposure rule f, where f is public and S_t is not." The counterparty sees E_t: gross and net exposure, leverage, concentration, drawdown-to-date, liquidity and funding terms, VaR exceptions against a committed model. The counterparty never sees S_t.

Earned is history; conduct is history; exposure is now. A lender extending credit, a clearer holding margin, an insurer pricing a policy, a venue setting limits, all need the current risk picture, and the only way to get it today is to be shown the book. Showing the book is exactly what a machine worth funding will refuse. This profile makes the picture provable without the book. The counterparty failures of 2022 were, in part, failures of visibility.

• X-01 Position snapshot S_t: the committed set of positions, balances and open orders at t, by venue, committed by hash. Grade: agent-supplied, venue-pulled or venue-signed (the rail's fill-provenance grades, applied to balances).
• X-02 Exposure rule f: a public, versioned function from (S_t, prices_t, funding_t) to the exposure object. v0.1 defines: gross notional, net notional, gross leverage, net leverage, top-N concentration by asset and by venue, 1-day and 10-day VaR under a committed model, realised drawdown-to-date, unencumbered liquidity, borrow and funding terms.
• X-03 Price and funding inputs: committed by hash and timestamp (VTR-1 R-10 construction), provenance graded.
• X-04 Freshness: the age of S_t at check time. The exposure-check reports it and the relying party sets the maximum.
• X-05 Exception: a day on which realised loss exceeded the committed VaR; exceptions are counted over the committed window (the backtesting construction of banking supervision, applied to a machine).

• X-06 S_t MUST be committed at or before t with a timestamp in the transparency log; snapshots form a chain, and gaps are reported.
• X-07 f and the VaR model MUST be committed by version before the window they score; a change creates a new epoch, counted.
• X-08 A counterparty MAY be named in the credential; a named-counterparty credential is decryptable by that counterparty only and carries the same public verdict object.
• X-09 Positions not in S_t are out of scope and the credential says so; venue-signed snapshots alone bound omission.

• X-10 The circuit recomputes E_t from S_t, prices_t and funding_t under f, and the exception count over the window; the outputs are E_t, the exception count, the snapshot count, the epoch count, and the hashes of f and the model.
• X-11 Snapshot count is bound in-circuit as the chain length; a missing snapshot changes the chain and is reported.
• X-12 Nothing about S_t leaves the proof: not assets, not sizes, not venues beyond the counts f reports. Where f reports concentration by asset, assets are reported as committed labels the relying party can match only if the owner discloses the mapping.
• X-13 An exposure credential MAY be bound to the conduct credential of the same identity, so the relying party sees "obeyed" and "exposed" together.

• X-14 One call: POST /api/exposure-check {agent | credential, max_age_s?, limits?}. Returns ALLOW or REFUSE, signed, with every check and its clause, valid for the freshness window the relying party sets (default 1 hour), failing closed. Same token family (typ = probatum-exposure-check/1).
• X-15 Checks: identity resolved · latest snapshot committed and its age (X-04, X-06) · provenance grade (X-01) · exposure object against the relying party's limits (X-02) · exception count against the relying party's tolerance (X-05) · epoch count · log inclusion.
• X-16 At the DECLARED class the check reads a declared exposure object bound to the identity and timestamped; every response says "declared by the agent; not recomputed in-circuit".
• X-17 A refused exposure-check is published beside passes with its reason class, never with the positions.

• X1 declared: exposure object declared, timestamped, bound. What the rail provides today.
• X2 committed: S_t chain committed; counts bound; E_t declared.
• X3 proven: E_t recomputed in-circuit from committed S_t and inputs.
• X4 venue-signed proven: X3 over venue-signed snapshots, bounding omission.

Not a margin call, not a limit, not a guarantee of solvency, not advice. An exposure credential attests that a committed snapshot produced the reported risk object under a public rule at a stated time. The relying party sets every threshold and keeps responsibility.